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Abstract
We explore metrics to evaluate the robustness of
real-world adversarial attacks, in particular adversarial
patches, to changes in environmental conditions. We
demonstrate how these metrics can be used to establish
model baseline performance and uncover model biases to
then compare against real-world adversarial attacks. We
establish a custom score for an adversarial condition that is
adjusted for different environmental conditions and explore
how the score changes with respect to specific environmen-
tal factors. Lastly, we propose two use cases for confidence
distributions in each environmental condition.
1. Introduction
Now that Deep Learning is an established success [13],
there is a rapidly expanding body of work assessing its lim-
itations [18, 10, 2]. In particular, there has been a large
number of papers published in recent years, interested in
finding new ways to hack deep learning systems with a
focus on manipulating convolutional neural networks into
false and missed classifications [16, 15, 3]. Much of the
early work with so-called adversarial attacks were only suc-
cessful in virtual environments, e.g. the adversarial inputs
were produced and evaluated digitally and without consid-
eration of physical limitations. In the past year, researchers
have expanded adversarial attacks to include physically cre-
ated objects that can impact classifiers and detector mod-
els in real-world systems [11, 1, 9, 20]. The range and
ability of physical attacks are improving at an impressive
rate, accounting for a variety of real-world considerations
including static scenes, robust angle and distance changes,
and video recorded from a moving vehicle. Although re-
searchers have established some guidelines for evaluating
the robustness of virtual adversarial attacks [4], the analy-
sis recommendations do not map subjectively onto physical
adversarial attacks where perturbations are difficult to mea-
sure and success varies on a frame by frame basis. The
consistent computational measure of success for physical
attacks is the percent of frames the attack accurately manip-
ulated the classifier or detector [8, 1, 21]. This is separate
from adversarial generation metrics that are often included
in the optimization loss function to improve physical chal-
lenges like imperceptibility and printability. In our work
we propose an evaluation experiment and post-generation,
effectiveness metrics for testing the robustness of real-world
adversarial examples in different environmental conditions.
In particular, we tested our metrics on adversarial “patches”,
an idea clearly outlined in work done by Thys et al. in [20],
but incorporating ideas from Athalye et al. in [1], Chen et
al. in [6], and Eykholt et al. in [8].
Figure 1: YOLOv2. Real-Time object detector running in
our lab. Note: Figures contain color. See online version.
2. Experiment
One of the primary goals of this paper is to introduce
a methodology for evaluating adversarial patches in phys-
ical, real-world environments. As such, it is important to
account for many environmental factors to systematically
study patch performance against a no-patch condition base-
line. While many researchers focus on the performance
of an adversarial attack in native environmental conditions
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(e.g. a patch on the bumper of a vehicle in actual traffic, a
patch attached to a stop sign, or a patch attached to a per-
son’s clothing in an office space), we assess performance
in a well-controlled environment with little frame-to-frame
variability due to moving objects, novel items entering the
scene, changing lighting, etc. This tight control is neces-
sary to accurately compare patch performance to a base-
line condition where the model is allowed to detect objects
without adversarial interference. In other words, we needed
an environment that was reproducible and where happen-
stance occurrences were not a factor. Below we outline our
methodology.
2.1. Equipment
We had two laboratory spaces for testing models and
patches. One space was used to pilot the experiment for
consistently performing target items, explore lighting con-
ditions, test target item distances, determine how to affix
patches in a consistent way, and debugging scripts. The
second space was a larger laboratory for running the ex-
periment and collecting the data (see Figure 1). Piloting is
often not reported with this line of experimentation, but we
feel that including some information about this procedure is
in line with other disciplines that often detail piloting pro-
cedures at length. Some adaptations were required to ac-
commodate the larger lab’s environment nuisances such as
a vent that would slightly move our background from time
to time. Barring a discussion on such minutiae, the second
lab space was designed to be completely static during ex-
perimentation and data collection. No trials were discarded
in our analysis. Equipment for the experiment included:
• Custom constructed mounting rail measuring roughly
7 feet long with attached platform (4 feet high) with
plate for attaching camera devices
• Jetson AGX Xavier
• Jetson AGX Xavier Camera set to a resolution of 1920
× 1080
• Pre-printed adversarial patches
• Tree Floor Lamp
• One 40 watt, 390 lumens halogen bulb and one 40 watt,
450 lumens LED bulb
2.2. Patch Generation
We generate our patches using the training technique
outlined by Thys et al. in [20]. The broad idea can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Curate a set of training images that your object detector
can recognize.
2. For each image we superimposed a patch (300 × 300
pixels, then scaled accordingly to fit the size of the ob-
ject bounding box) to the image. We use the Expec-
tation over Transformation algorithm to produce our
adversarial patch using the following transformations:
change of location, rotation angle, scale, brightness,
contrast, and noise level [1].
3. We extract a classification score from these altered im-
ages, back-propagate the gradients to the input layer,
and only update the pixels inside the region of the
patch.
We leverage and extend the code-base provided in [19]
to generate adversarial patches for all classes contained in
the output of our model. In our case, these are all classes in
the COCO dataset [14].
We trained three patches for the vase class using im-
ages from ImageNet [7] and OpenImages [12]. Our patches
were obtained by minimizing two different objective func-
tions: objectness score (O) and the product of class proba-
bility score and objectness score (CxO). For our ImageNet
patches we triage images from the WordnetID n04522168,
corresponding to the ImageNet “vase” class. For our Com-
posite patch, we combined our extracted images from Ima-
geNet with images extracted from OpenImages correspond-
ing to the “vase” class name.
2.3. Procedure
During piloting we found our patches should be 2 × 2
inches with the generation method we opted to use [20]. We
manipulated three environmental conditions/dimensions:
target item distance (1 inch, 5 inches, 10 inches, 15 inches
and 20 inches from Plexiglas surface), patch placement lo-
cation (center and slight right of center), and lighting (2
bulb types) [5 × 2 × 2 = 20 environmental conditions].
There were five patch conditions including no-patch (base-
line), ImageNet (O), ImageNet (CxO), Composite (CxO),
and a white patch, which was a simple white 2 inch square
cut from 8.5 × 11 inches, 92 bright copy paper. All patches
were printed on the aforementioned office paper at 1200 dpi.
See Section 2.2 for more details. Each patch type, except
for the no-patch condition, was used in all environmental
conditions. For the no-patch condition, the target item was
always center-placed, but used with all light source and dis-
tance combinations.
Our camera was placed 5 inches from a Plexiglas surface
affixed to a table. The Plexiglas served as a mounting struc-
ture to ensure consistent placement for each patch. There
was a single light source used at a time and the source was
positioned behind and above the camera, pointed toward the
target placement region. The camera was placed on the rail
platform and fixed for the duration of the experiment. A
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large black board was used as background for the experi-
ment.
Testing proceeded as follows:
1. For a given distance, the target item (a green vase, see
Figure 3) was placed in one of two positions depending
on the patch placement condition (center positioned or
left of center).
2. With the target fixed, the no-patch condition was
recorded first. Then each patch was placed in sequence
of white patch, ImageNet (O), ImageNet (CxO), and
Composite (CxO). Each time a patch was placed, it
remained untouched through both lighting conditions.
This was to minimize object and patch shifts across the
conditions.
3. Once a scene was established, we allowed 30 seconds
for the bulb to warm-up.
4. We ran a script that captured 500 frames and used each
frame as an independent input to YOLOv2 [17]. We
wanted enough frames for a single scene for a robust
evaluation of that condition in lieu of natural image
variation produced by the camera or by nature.
5. We recorded bounding boxes, confidences, objectness
scores for each frame.
3. Results and New Metric
3.1. Patch Effectiveness
Figure 2: Patches generated for experiment
(a) ImageNet (CxO) (b) ImageNet (O)
(c) Composite (CxO)
Each of the patches in Figure 2 was designed to hide
a target item (e.g. a green vase) from detection for the
YOLOv2 classifier. In addition to these patches, a simple
white square patch was also used to compare performance
with an occlusion case. A first evaluation of each patch’s
ability to hide the target was to simply count the number
of frames the classifier was able to detect the target class
in each scene (See Table 1). This is a standard measure.
Higher values in the table indicate the patch was not effec-
tive at disrupting detection of the target.
There are a few conditions that stand out when look-
ing at only frequencies. When the target item was placed
very close to the camera (1 inch condition) and no patch
was present, the classifier had difficulty detecting it. In all
frames with LED lighting, the target was missed, while in
the halogen bulb lighting, the target was detected in less
than 40% of frames. Another stand-out is the LED, 1-inch,
ImageNet (CxO) condition where the number of detections
is higher than 500. In this case, the target is detected twice,
once as a lower identification of the target and an upper
identification of the target (see Figure 3).
Judging from frequency alone, one might conclude that
the Composite (CxO) patch and ImageNet (CxO) patch are
better than the other two patches. This conclusion would
match intuition since one patch had a larger training set and
both of these patches were trained using an objective func-
tion accounting for both class and objectness score. But
there is more to be discovered. For instance, suppose one
desired an all-around effective patch for a variety of physi-
cal environments. Is the Composite (CxO) patch better than
the ImageNet (CxO) patch? A problem with error frequency
is that is does not account for how well the model performs
without adversarial interference. In the LED, 1-inch case,
not having a patch at all is better than adding anything to the
scene. We seek to develop a score that not only accounts for
a variety of environmental changes, but also accounts for
baseline performance in one summary.
Figure 3: In this condition the vase was detected twice in
nearly all frames.
Our proposed score is derived for each patch in a given
condition (or conditions). We extend frequencies via a com-
parison to the no-patch condition or baseline. For a given
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Table 1: Number of vase detections for each condition.
*When no patch was present, targets were center located. Thus, only one run of the model at different distances and bulb
types was completed without a patch.
Location Bulb Distance None Composite (CxO) ImageNet (CxO) ImageNet (O) White Patch
center halogen 1 inch 182 7 0 500 500
5 inches 404 20 0 500 500
10 inches 500 0 0 30 0
15 inches 298 0 0 1 0
20 inches 499 0 0 32 0
LED 1 inch 0 419 955 500 500
5 inches 500 500 391 500 500
10 inches 500 27 0 500 456
15 inches 500 0 0 500 0
20 inches 500 0 0 28 0
right halogen 1 inch 182* 0 18 499 479
5 inches 404* 0 206 500 313
10 inches 500* 206 0 302 1
15 inches 298* 0 0 26 0
20 inches 499* 0 0 1 0
LED 1 inch 0* 2 457 500 500
5 inches 500* 247 500 500 500
10 inches 500* 500 500 500 500
15 inches 500* 479 500 500 490
20 inches 500* 0 0 0 120
patch P and a single environmental condition e (e.g. light-
ing, distance, patch location), we compute the frequency of
detection. Let the fP,e be the frequency for a given patch
and environmental condition. Then we define the score for
a patch conditionally over the set of environments to be
SE(P ) =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
(
f∅,e − fP,e
)
500
(1)
where E is the set of all environmental conditions. Note
that this is the average difference of detection probabilities
between the no-patch and patch conditions. For this score
function, when the target is detected in all 500 frames and
the patch successfully hides the target in all 500 frames, the
score will be 1. When the baseline model is unsuccessful
at detecting the target, the score is lower. Lastly, the score
is averaged across all conditions run. The scores for our
patches are given in Table 2. It is interesting to note that by
our metric, the white patch outscores the patch trained us-
ing only the ImageNet corpus with objective function only
utilizing the objectness score from YOLOv2. Further inves-
tigation is needed to explore why this occurred.
We also computed scores for each condition independent
of the other conditions. We ran an ANOVA on this data
with factors Patch Location, Bulb Type, Target Distance,
and Patch. Bulb type, target distance, and patch were all
Table 2: Patch scores.
Patch Condition Score
No-Patch 0
Composite (CxO) 0.536
ImageNet (CxO) 0.424
ImageNet (O) 0.135
White Patch 0.241
Table 3: ANOVA on scores.
df sum.sq mean.sq F PR(>F)
Lctn. 1.0 0.16 0.16 1.04 3.11e-01
Bulb 1.0 2.25 2.25 14.89 2.16e-04
Dist. 4.0 16.43 4.11 27.21 9.31e-15
Patch 4.0 3.73 0.93 6.18 1.97e-04
Resid. 89.0 13.43 0.15 NaN NaN
significant factors. The analysis in the next section dives
into the pattern of results on these dimensions.
3.2. Dimension Impacts
Recall that for a 1 inch distance, baseline model perfor-
mance was particularly poor. However in the ImageNet and
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white patch conditions model performance increased sig-
nificantly, regardless of lighting or center/right patch place-
ment. This may indicate that pre-trained YOLOv2 is not
robust to large-scaled objects. Somehow, more generic oc-
clusions provides YOLOv2 with enough context to make an
accurate identification.
Figure 4: Image capture of YOLOv2 detection at 5 dis-
tances with white patch under LED lighting.
In addition to poor model/patch performance for close
distances, the scores dip when the target item is 15 inches
from the Plexiglas. The dip could be driven by either low
baseline model performance at 15 inches, or by poor patch
performance. A quick look at Table 1 reveals that baseline
model performance also decreases at 15 inches (number of
correct detections without the patch is 298 out of the pos-
sible 500 for halogen bulbs). When this occurs, the model
score decreases since the score is relative to baseline.
Figure 5: Mean confidence per distance.
We also recorded confidence scores for each condition
to study if there was a relationship with patch performance.
Confidence scores did not influence patch performance
across the distances. Figure 5 displays the average confi-
dence for each distance and each patch condition. Baseline
and ImageNet are the only two patch conditions that de-
crease from 5 inches to 20 inches. The two other simulated
patches are consistently high for 5 to 15 inches and then ef-
fectively hide the target at 20 inches, while the white patch
telescopes in performance. One might expect lower confi-
dence scores leading to fewer detection. However, confi-
dence scores are constructed independently of probability
of detection within YOLOv2. The model detects a target
when the objectness score is above 0.5 and to prevent mul-
tiple detections of the same object, the NMS threshold is set
to 0.4. The two patch conditions with consistently high con-
fidences for the vase are also the two patches that performed
the best at hiding the vase. At 15 inches (where all simu-
lated patches have a sudden decrease in score), the highest
scoring patch, Composite (CxO), has a higher confidence
when the target is detected than the baseline model. This
provides some experimental evidence that confidence score
alone, without context to other class scores, are not a clear
predictor of success for patches designed to hide a target.
Figure 6: Score by distance for each patch.
An alternative explanation for model performance be-
yond 10 inches is that the target itself is mostly occluded
from camera view at further distances. More than 97%
of all frames at this distance were successfully either mis-
classified or not identified considering all patches. The
sub-condition with the highest detection frequency occurred
with the white patch placed slightly right of the target under
LED lighting. Further testing is required to confirm occlu-
sion is the main reason for poor performance. A counter
condition is the ImageNet patch. When that patch was used
there were 60 correct detections across lighting at center
location, but only a single correct detection when the tar-
get was slightly right of the patch. The white patch, LED,
right-position condition led to 120 of the 500 frames having
correct detections at 20 inches.
Lighting was also a significant factor for patch scores.
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Figure 7 displays the difference in lighting used for this
experiment. We predicted that for the LED condition, the
patches would be more effective at hiding the target. How-
ever, the LED condition resulted in fewer disappearances
(more correct detections) than the halogen condition. This
is surprising given the LED is more luminescent.
Figure 7: Image capture of YOLOv2 detection at 2 light
configurations (LED and halogen with white patch at 10
inches.
Considering only changes in this factor, we find that
across the two lighting conditions, the Composite (CxO)
and ImageNet (CxO) patches outperform the other two
patches. In addition, the white patch has higher scores than
the ImageNet (O) patch in both lighting conditions. Per-
formance in the halogen bulb condition is limited to 0.7
by the fact that we are averaging scores across the other
dimensions (location and distance) and there are cases in
which the baseline model had missed detection occurrences
in these conditions.
Figure 8: Score by light for each patch.
The same trend, although on a smaller scale, occurs
when marginalizing over location values. Figure 10 de-
picts mean values at each location. We computed 68%
(roughly two standard deviations) confidence intervals by
a bootstrapping procedure. Across the two target loca-
tions, the confidence intervals have high overlap which
is an indicator that performance is likely equal regardless
of target location. The Composite (CxO) and ImageNet
(CxO) patches are the only two that had confidence inter-
vals that did not overlap with a score of 0, indicating that
for both location conditions, these patches had some effect
on YOLOv2. However, after running one-way ANOVA’s,
even these patches were not significantly different from 0
(p =[0.323, 0.219, 0.969, 0.595] for Composite (CxO), Im-
ageNet (CxO), ImageNet, and white patch, respectively).
Figure 9: Image capture of YOLOv2 detection at 2 loca-
tion configurations (center and right) with white patch at 10
inches under LED lighting.
Figure 10: Score by location for each patch.
3.3. Effectiveness Score
For our experiment, three of the four patches were virtu-
ally ineffective for the right-sided target placement under
LED lighting. The remaining patch admitted many cor-
rect identifications of the vase under this condition. While
we may ponder this case and speculate at the causes, this
case highlights the need for a measure of patch effectiveness
when detections are not eliminated. We propose a straight-
forward calculation and approach.
For two conditions under which a single detection model
is being assessed (say condition 1 and condition 2), con-
sider a single target class. For each condition, collect all
model confidences corresponding to each camera frame in
which the model detected the target class in roughly the
same bounding box. Thus, we have a distribution of con-
fidences for condition 1 and a distribution for condition 2
for a single target. We compare the two conditions by con-
sidering either the Kolmogorov - Smirnov statistic or the
Wasserstein distance between the two distributions. This
provides a relatively straightforward comparative computa-
tion in which researchers can apply several follow-on anal-
yses. We highlight a few of these cases here:
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Case 1. (Using Full Distribution of Confidences). As
seen in Table 1, the ImageNet (O) patch performs particu-
larly poorly in LED lighting. When baseline performs per-
fectly (that is, the target is identified in each frame), the
global patch score derived above cannot distinguish the con-
ditions. By considering the KS metric with baseline, there
are three cases that are most similar to baseline, 1. right, 5
inch, 2. center, 5 inch, and 3. right, 10 inch (ks = 0.498,
0.664, and 0.948 respectively).
Case 2. (Exploring Data Patterns). Using the Wasser-
stein Distance we consider all pairwise distances between
conditions for the ImageNet (O) patch. For the condition
where there were no correct detections (20 inches, right-
placed patch, and LED lighting) we impute the maximum
relative distance. From this distance matrix on conditions,
we embed them in a 2-dimensional representation using
multidimensional scaling. The circled point is the condi-
tion in which ImageNet effectively hid the target. Clusters
in this space reflect like-conditions (e.g. same lighting or
patch placement). By color coding with respect to the levels
of each dimension in Figure 11, we can see that the distance
dimension provides a clear correlation with global score re-
sults. In fact, the distance dimension strongly dominates the
linear shape of the points. We conjecture that the order (20
inches, 15 inches, 1 inch and 10 inches, and 5 inches) is an
indicator of least to most ‘optimal’ viewing conditions for
the baseline model.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper makes two contributions. First, we propose
a metric for adversarial attacks in the physical world. The
metric compares attack performance to a baseline. We com-
pute the metric in a controlled environment with repro-
ducible environmental conditions. In addition, the metric
reveals bias in the baseline models. We include two poten-
tial use cases for the proposed metric. The second contri-
bution is that this is the most controlled systematic study
of baseline model performance and its relationship to ad-
versarial attacks that we are aware of. Chen et al. [6] had
an indoor systematic assessment of sticker attacks but did
not investigate varying controlled lighting and placement,
rather distance and angle. While many of the current papers
highlight that their patch generation methods work well in
the real world, it is of importance to account for the weak-
nesses in any method to not only prevent other researchers
from making the same mistakes, but to advance scientific
understanding of deep learning models in general. It is our
aim that the approach taken in this paper strives towards
a full-report model and has added some understanding to
real-world challenges facing adversarial attacks and under-
standing deep-learning models alike.
Figure 11: MDS solutions using Wasserstein distance be-
tween condition confidences.
One may notice that our investigation, while exposing
weaknesses in the YOLOv2 model with respect to trained
physical adversarial attacks, does not provide an answer to
why the models are vulnerable to certain real-world factors.
This is a difficult problem that many recent advances have
attempted to solve. A good summary on this work is [5]. In
our own investigation, we suspect camera aspects are driv-
ing frame to frame variation and model training is interact-
ing with environmental conditions to produce odd model
results (such as the baseline model not detecting a vase six
inches in front of the camera). In future work, we will ex-
tend the score derived here to study whether there are any
systematic patterns to model and adversarial attack weak-
nesses.
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